PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED
MOTORISTS IN NEW JERSEY
Reginald Stanton*
I.

INTRODUCrION AND OVERVIEW

In adopting Chapter 385 of the Laws of 1968, New Jersey became
the forty-eighth state to require automobile liability insurers to offer
their policyholders protection against uninsured motorists. Becoming
the forty-eighth state to do something scarcely amounts to revolutionary
innovation, yet Chapter 385 did work a fundamental change in New
Jersey's approach to the problems posed by the uninsured motorist. It
significantly altered the method of financing protection against the
uninsured motorist, and, as implemented by the New Jersey Department of Insurance and the insurance industry, it totally restructured
the handling of claims against the uninsured motorist.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 385, New Jersey relied on the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law' in protecting its residents
against the uninsured motorist. Enacted in 1952, that law provided
for an Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund which would be used to
satisfy the claims of New Jersey residents who suffered bodily injury
or property damage as a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist in an accident occurring within the State of New Jersey after April
1, 1955.2 The Fund was to be created by special assessments placed
against persons registering motor vehicles in the state and by special
assessments against the net direct written premiums of companies
selling automobile liability insurance in the state. The first assessment
was $3.00 for a person registering an uninsured motor vehicle, $1.00
for a person registering an insured motor vehicle, and, for the insurance
companies, / of 1% of the net direct written premiums for the
,calendar year 1953. Once the initial assessment was made to get the
Fund started, the Fund was to be maintained by an annual fee collected
from the registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle in an amount to be
fixed by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, but not to
-exceed $15.00, and then, if receipts from uninsured registrants' fees
were not sufficient, by an annual assessment against automobile insur* A.B., St. Peter's College; A.B., A.M., Oxford University; J.D., New York University;
Member, New Jersey Bar.
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (1961).
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-91 (1961).
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ance companies in an amount to be fixed by the Director, but not to
exceed 2 of 10% of the aggregate net direct written premiums earned
by all automobile insurers during the preceding year. 3 Note that no
annual Fund maintenance charge was to be made against the registrants
of insured motor vehicles.
Experience with claims against the Fund revealed that the original
scheme of annual assessments for maintenance of the Fund was inadequate. Consequently, the Director of Motor Vehicles was authorized to
raise the annual assessment against the registrants of uninsured motor
vehicles to $50.00 and the annual assessment against automobile insurance companies to 1% of the aggregate net direct written premiums
earned by them during the preceding year.4 The Director used his
fee charging and assessment authority to its limits, but the Fund was
still under financial stress when Chapter 385 of the Laws of 1968 was
adopted. 5
The financial history of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
is informative, since it proves an important point that has long been
obvious to the legislatures of most states and which ought to have been
obvious long ago in New Jersey. That point is that the cost of insuring
against loss caused by uninsured motorists cannot realistically be met
by a scheme which is significantly dependent for its funding upon
contributions from uninsured motorists. A sound scheme has to include
within its framework a large number in absolute terms, and a heavy
percentage in relative terms, of reasonably safe drivers who have
sufficient financial resources to support whatever level of contribution
is necessary to fund the scheme. Uninsured motorists are a relatively
small class of persons, but they include within their ranks a disproportionately high number of unsafe drivers, a disproportionately high
number of economically poor persons and a disproportionately high
number of socially inadequate persons. A protection scheme which
depends heavily upon this group of disadvantaged persons for funding
may be philosophically satisfying to the type of middle-class person
who takes very seriously the duty of the poor to improve themselves,
but it won't work. Theoretically, the special fee charged the uninsured
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63 (1961), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63 (Supp.
1971-72).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63(d)(1), (2) (Supp. 1971-72).
5 See the financial schedules attached to Manager's Annual Report to the Unsatisfied
Claim And Judgment Fund Board, April 30, 1971, at 5-12 (hereinafter cited as Manager's
Report). Amounts paid out by the Fund have exceeded $5,000,000.00 in each of the past
five years. Although reserves for payment are probably adequate, they have been lower in
recent high payment years than they were in the early low payment years of the Fund.
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motorist could be raised to a level where it would pay the cost of
protection. Practically, however, the effect of a suliciently high fee is
to put the honest poor off the road and the dishonest poor into unregistered vehicles."
The simple truth seems to be that the most effective way to finance
protection against uninsured motorists is to spread the burden over the
broad class of insured motorists. Let the insured motorist purchase
protection against the uninsured motorist. This is precisely what
Chapter 385 does. In fact, it goes a step further by requiring the
automobile liability insurer to offer its customer the opportunity to
purchase such coverage whenever it delivers a policy of automobile
liability insurance within the state. 7 This represents a fundamental
break with the law which prohibited an automobile liability insurer
from selling protection against uninsured motorists to a New Jersey
customer, even if both the insurer and the customer desired to put
such protection into effect.8
The way in which Chapter 385 shifts the financial burden of
protecting against uninsured motorists is interesting. Two of the three
basic sections of Chapter 385 found their way into the Insurance
Title of the New Jersey statutes. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970),
requires the insurer, whenever it issues or renews an automobile
liability policy within the state, with respect to an automobile registered
in or principally garaged within the state, to offer in connection therewith coverage for payment of all or part of the sums which the insured
would be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile or a hit-and-run automobile. The
amount of the coverage is to be $10,000.00 for injury to or death of one
person in any one accident, $20,000.00 for injury to or death of more
than one person in any one accident, and $5,000.00 for damage to
property in any one accident. The amounts of coverage are exactly the
same as the limitations on payments from the Fund specified in the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law. 9 The policy provisions
affording the coverage are to be approved by the Commissioner of
Insurance. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.2 (1970), gives the insured under
6 See Manager's Report at 1, where reference
status.
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970).
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1. Historical Note
§ 1, [1961] N.J. Laws 34, permitted the insurer to
for accidents occurring outside of New Jersey, but the
insurance.
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961).

is made to false reports of insured

(1970). Law of April 19, 1961, ch. 11,
offer uninsured motorists protection

insurer was not required to offer such
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an automobile liability policy the right to accept or reject the offered
protection against uninsured motorists. 10
The third of the three basic sections of Chapter 385 effected an
amendment of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law by
altering the definition of a "qualified person." This definitional amendment of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-62 (Supp. 1971-72), now makes it
impossible for a person who has insurance coverage against uninsured
motorists to be a "qualified person" within the meaning of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law. In short, he cannot collect
from the Fund. Chapter 385 does not abolish the Fund. It leaves the
Fund intact, but it limits claims against the Fund by disqualifying the
person who has insurance protection against uninsured motorists from
making claims against the Fund.
The financial implications of this change in the definition of a
"qualified person" become apparent when certain facts are considered.
In 1970, a total of 3,744,201 motor vehicles were registered in New
Jersey." Of those vehicles, 77,892, or 2.08% were uninsured, while
3,666,309, or 97.92%, were insured. 12 Although precise figures are not
available, knowledgeable observers believe that almost all of the insured motorists have elected to purchase insurance protection against
non-insured motorists under endorsements to their automobile liability
policies.' 3 This means that the overwhelming majority of New Jersey
motorists, probably something on the order of 3,500,000 motorists, are
no longer qualified to assert claims against the Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund, but must instead look to their own insurance
carrier if they become involved in an accident with an uninsured
motorist. There are, in fact, very few people left who are qualified to
assert claims against the Fund.
Some of the other financial implications of the facts mentioned in
the preceding paragraph are interesting. The current charge for obtaining an endorsement insuring against damages caused by uninsured
10 Note that the statutory provision requires a written election. The practice in New
Jersey seems to be that the insurance company offers a policy at a higher price with the
coverage than without it, with the insured's written election taking the form of the higher
or lower amount of his insurance premium check.
11 New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, Comparative Annual Revenue Report

(1969-70).
12 These figures were provided by the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board.
Letter from Supervisor of Uninsured Motorists Fees, Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund Board to Seton Hall Law Review, undated.
13 Personnel at the Division of Motor Vehicles have the impression that "practically
everyone" is electing to take the coverage. Manager's Report at 2, states that according to
reports received from carriers, the "great majority" of insureds are electing to take the
coverage.
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motorists is $5.00 per year, per insured vehicle. 14 A charge of that
modest size levied against 3,500,000 insured motorists produces a fund
(omitting allowances for selling, general administrative and claims
adjustment costs) of $17,500,000 which is available for covering damages caused by uninsured motorists. On the other hand, a special registration charge of $50.00 per year, per uninsured motorist, which is the
charge currently being made by the Director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles, 15 when levied against 77,892 uninsured motorists, produces a
fund (omitting allowances for general administrative and claims adjustment costs) of only $3,894,600 which is available for covering damages
caused by uninsured motorists. The $3,894,600 sum may prove to be
sufficient now that most persons will no longer look to the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund, but, prior to the enactment of Chapter
385, a sum of that magnitude was woefully inadequate to cover the
claims against the Fund. Consequently, prior to the enactment of
Chapter 385, the Director of Motor Vehicles was heavily dependent, in
attempting to keep the Fund at an adequate level, upon his power
under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63 (Supp. 1971-72), to levy an annual
assessment against the automobile insurance industry of up to 1% of
the aggregate net direct written premiums earned by the insurers
during the year preceding the assessment. Even after making allowances
for the Director's assessment power against the insurance industry, it is
clear that the most effective and painless way to raise funds for covering
claims against uninsured motorists is to permit the vast number of
insured motorists to purchase, at a small per capita charge, protection
against the uninsured motorist.
In addition to shifting the financial base for providing protection
against uninsured motorists, Chapter 385, as implemented by the
Commissioner of Insurance, completely changed the way in which
the typical motorist asserts a claim for damages arising out of an
accident with an uninsured motorist. Under the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund Law, a motorist who intends to make a claim against
the Fund for damages caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, must, as a condition precedent to his right to apply for payment
from the Fund, give notice of his intention to make a claim within
90 days after the accident.' 6 That notice is filed with the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund Board, a body composed of the Director of
the Division of Motor Vehicles, the Commissioner of Insurance, and
14 Telephone conversation from Newark to N.J. Department of Insurance, Trenton,
Nov. 4, 1971.

15 Manager's Report at 1. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63(d)(1) (Supp. 1971-72).
16 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (Supp. 1971-72).
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four representatives of the insurance industry.' 7 The claimant then
proceeds with his cause of action against the uninsured defendant. If he
institutes court action, he must furnish the Board with a copy of the
complaint within 15 days after instituting the action.18 The Board has
the right in all cases where notice of intention to claim against the
Fund has been given, and the duty in cases where the defendant
defaults, to assign the claim or action to an automobile liability insurer
for investigation and defense.' 9 Assignments to insurers are made under
a scheme which apportions this burden in accordance with the relative
size of the insurers' automobile liability premium writings. 20 If the
defendant defaults in the court action, as he frequently does, counsel
for the insurer to whom the matter has been assigned may take over
21
the defense in the name of and on behalf of the defendant.
If the defendant does not default, the insurer to whom the matter
has been assigned may, nevertheless, through counsel, enter an appearance on behalf of the defendant, file a defense, conduct his defense at
the trial and seek appellate review on his behalf. 22 These acts undertaken by the assigned insurer's counsel are deemed to be the acts of the
defendant, even though the applicable statutory provision also expressly
reserves to the defendant the right to employ his own counsel and to
defend the action.2 3 Although an extraordinarily awkward situation
would arise if both assigned insurer's counsel and defendant's own
counsel attempted simultaneously to exercise rights under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6-67 (Supp. 1971-72), especially if they had conflicting views
of the appropriate trial strategy, sixteen years of experience with the
Fund does not seem to have yielded any reported cases dealing with that
problem. The absence of reported conflicts over defense is undoubtedly
attributable to the fact that the typical uninsured defendant's financial
condition makes him personally judgment proof, so that he lacks both
the incentive and the means to defend the action through his own
24
counsel.
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-64 (1961).
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (Supp. 1971-72).
19
20
21
22
23

N.J.
N.J.
N.J.
N.J.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§

39:6-66(a), (b) (1961).
39:6-66(c) (1961).
39:6-75 (1961).
39:6-67 (Supp. 1971-72).

Id.
24 On the other hand, it is interesting to note that not all uninsureds are totally insolvent. During the period from April 1, 1955 to March 31, 1971, the Fund recovered
by way of reimbursement from uninsured motorists the sum of $3,907,804.85. This compares to payments from the Fund during that period of $54,584,346.91. Manager's Report
at 6, 9.
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It is possible for a claimant and an uninsured defendant to settle
a pending court action in a fashion which will enable the claimant to
obtain payment of the settlement out of the Fund. This requires,
among other things, consent of the Board to the terms of the settlement
and a showing that any judgment obtained by the claimant against the
defendant would be uncollectable. 25 If a case is not settled but proceeds
instead to trial and judgment in favor of the claimant, the claimant can
apply for an order from the court in which the judgment was entered
directing the treasurer of the Fund to pay the judgment. 26 To be
successful in obtaining the order, the claimant must show, among other
things, that he has made a diligent and unsuccessful effort to collect the
27
amount of the judgment from the uninsured defendant.
Regardless of the size of his judgment or settlement, the successful
claimant's recovery from the Fund is limited to the maximum amounts
of $10,000.00 for bodily injury to, or death of, one person in any one
accident, $20,000.00 for bodily injury to, or death of, more than one
person in any one accident, and $5,000.00 for damage to property in
any one accident. 28 Payments from the Fund do not serve the purpose
of insurance as far as the uninsured defendant is concerned, because
the Fund ends up with a judgment against the uninsured defendant.
The Fund achieves this status of judgment creditor through confession
of judgment by the defendant in the case of an approved settlement, 29
and through assignment of judgment by the claimant in the case where
the claimant obtains a judgment against the defendant followed by a
court order directing the Fund to pay the judgment.8 0
Thus, except for the hit-and-run situation where the identity of the
tortfeasor is unknown and where the claimant has a statutory right of
action directly against the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles, 31
the payment of damages from the Fund always leaves the uninsured
motorist, on account of whom the damages were paid, in the position of
being a judgment debtor of the Fund. This puts the attorney who is
assigned to handle the matter on behalf of the Fund in an ambiguous
and uncomfortable position. He is appointed for the purpose of protect§ 39:6-72(b)(3) (Supp. 1971-72).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961). Interestingly enough, over the years of its existence, the Fund has paid out almost three times as much by way of settlement as by way
of judgment: $39,647,601.85 in settlements, as compared to $14,936,745.06 in judgments.
Manager's Report at 5.
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-70 (Supp. 1971-72).
28 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-69, -73 (1961).
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-72(a)(7) (Supp. 1971-72).
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-77 (Stipp. 1971-72).
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-78 (1961).
25 N.J. STAT. ANN.
26
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ing the interest of the Fund, an interest which is inherently antagonistic
to that of the uninsured defendant, yet he typically ends up with the
task of conducting the defense for the uninsured motorist. His position
is considerably more awkward than that of an attorney employed by an
insurance carrier to defend an action brought against an insured
motorist. Sometimes in the case where there is insurance, the defense
attorney employed by the insurance carrier is placed in a difficult
professional and ethical position by the failure of the insured to
cooperate, by a disclaimer of coverage, or, more commonly, by a claim
in excess of policy limitsA2 Yet, the defense case where there is insurance
usually involves a cooperative defendant, no disclaimer of coverage,
and damages which an experienced defense attorney knows do not
realistically exceed the policy limits.8 3 In short, the typical case where
there is insurance does not usually involve a meaningful conflict of
interest between the insured and his carrier, whereas the typical Fund
case always involves a conflict of interest between the uninsured defen34
dant and the Fund.
The attorney assigned by the Fund to handle the defense of an
uninsured motorist case attempts to cope with the conflict problem by
being cautious and formalistic in his dealings with the defendant whose
case he is handling. His feel for the particular case and his knowledge
of the range of judgments recovered or settlements made in comparable
cases may lead to his concluding that the case should be settled for, say,
$8,000.00, but he is reluctant and cautious about suggesting the settlement to the defendant because he knows that the settlement will impose
individual liability upon the defendant. The result is that the defense
attorney is much less effective in trying to work out a settlement in a
Fund case than he is in the case where there is insurance, with the
result, among others, that the plaintiff in a Fund case often has an
unusually hard time in getting his case settled on a reasonable basis.38
32 See generally Board of Educ. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 293 F. Supp. 541 (D.N.J.
1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1969); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d
7 (1970); Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968).
83 There are no reported statistics to prove this, but the fact is that there are few
reported cases of conflict between insurer and insured, in light of the thousands of automobile accident cases which are defended by insurers in the courts of New Jersey each
year.
84 The point here is that there is no real conflict of interest in the insurance case,
unless there is a disclaimer of coverage, or a meaningful possibility of a recovery in excess
of policy limits. The claim settled within policy limits does not lead to any dispute between insurer and insured and does not give rise to any contested claim of one against
the other. In the Fund case, the Fund always has a claim against the uninsured motorist,
and, over the years of the Fund's existence, the Fund has successfully recovered
$3,907,804.85 from uninsured motorists. See note 24 supra.
35 There is no published documentation supporting this statement, but it does repre-
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Keeping in mind the fact that most New Jersey motorists now have
insurance coverage against uninsured motorists, Chapter 385 fundamentally restructured the system for asserting claims against uninsured
motorists. Chapter 385 does not specify how an insured motorist is to
assert claims against the uninsured motorist, but it does grant to the
Commissioner of Insurance the power to approve the provisions of any
coverage against uninsured motorists to be offered in New Jersey.38
Chapter 385 took effect in New Jersey on April 2, 1969, 7 and, as of that
date, the Commissioner of Insurance approved a single form of coverage
against uninsured motorists which must be used by all insurers writing
automobile liability policies in New Jersey. 38 That form is still in use,
as of the date of this article, as the sole approved form. 9 The form acts
as an endorsement to the insured's automobile liability policy and its
full text is set forth at the end of this article. For convenience sake, the
specific coverage against uninsured motorists afforded in New Jersey
will hereinafter be referred to as the "New Jersey Endorsement Providing Insurance Against Uninsured Motorists," or more frequently,
simply as the "Endorsement" or the "New Jersey Endorsement."
Section I of the Endorsement states that the determination as to
whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from an
uninsured motorist, and, if so, the amount of the damages, shall be
made by agreement between the insured and the company, or, if they
fail to agree, by arbitration. Item F of Section VI of the Endorsement
provides that arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
rules of the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter usually referred to as the "AAA") unless the insured and the company agree to
some other means of conducting the arbitration. The New Jersey
Endorsement provisions regarding arbitration are similar to the policies
written in most other states. The AAA is well prepared to process
uninsured motorist claims, and experience in other states indicates that
most parties follow the AAA procedures rather than try to fix alternate
procedures by special agreement. 40 It should be noted that the arbitrasent a view held by many members of the negligence bar. Negligence practitioners also
seem to believe that the Fund is more reluctant to settle than the typical insurance carrier, and many such practitioners believe that this tightness of the purse strings is a major
problem.
86 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (1970).
37 Law of January 2, 1969, ch. 385, § 5, [1 968] N.J. Laws 1277.
38 Letter from Horace J. Bryant, Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, to all
automobile liability insurance companies in New Jersey, dated April 16, 1969.
89 The Department of Insurance was contacted for any changes in the form of
coverage and the check revealed none. Telephone Conversation from Newark to N.J. Department of Insurance, Trenton, Nov. 9, 1971.
40 Interview with Gerald Aksen, General Counsel of the AAA, November 29, 1971
(hereinafter cited as AAA Interview).
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tion is between the insured and the company. The uninsured motorist
whose actions give rise to the claim is not a party to the arbitration
and is not in any sense bound by the determination. 41 This contrasts
sharply with the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law where
the claim must be asserted against the uninsured defendant and carried
42
to a successful conclusion against him before the Fund will pay.
Chapter 385 of the Laws of 1968 has dramatically changed the system in New Jersey for dealing with the uninsured motorist. The financial base for providing protection has been shifted and, as implemented
by the New Jersey Endorsement Providing Insurance Against Uninsured
Motorists, Chapter 385 has supplied an entirely different procedure for
handling the vast bulk of claims against uninsured motorists. The Endorsement is new in New Jersey, so new, in fact, that reported New
Jersey cases dealing with it are nonexistent. However, close counterparts to the New Jersey Endorsement have been in use in many other
states for a long period of time 43 and there is, throughout the United
States, an extensive body of case law and of experience dealing with
the host of legal problems presented by insurance coverage against
uninsured motorists. New Jersey thus finds itself today with a method
for dealing with the uninsured motorist which is locally brand new
but which has been well tested elsewhere. The purpose of this article
is to examine some of the problems and questions which will arise in
New Jersey as a result of the Endorsement coverage which is now
41 The only right which the insurer acquires against the uninsured motorist as a
result of paying its insured under the Endorsement is the right to require the insured to
bring a suit against'the uninsured motorist for the benefit of the insurer. See Appendix,
Endorsement § VI G, which subrogates the insurer to the rights of the insured against the
uninsured motorist.
42 Either a settlement under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-72 (Supp. 1971-72), or a judgment

under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-69 (1961). It should be noted that the second paragraph of
section I of the Endorsement (Appendix) establishes a procedure under which the insured
may, with the written consent of the company, prosecute an action against the uninsured
motorist. If such consent is given, the company will be bound by the judgment entered
in the action. Such a procedure obviates the need for arbitration, but experience in other
states indicates that it is almost never used. The reason for non-use is that there is not
much point in the insured's going to the trouble and delay of a court action against the
uninsured motorist, except possibly in the rare case where there might be damages in
excess of the recovery limits of the Endorsement and an uninsured defendant who was
so prosperous that he could reasonably be expected to pay the heavy damages which
might be awarded.
43 The general form of endorsement providing coverage against uninsured motorists
presently used in most states was jointly promulgated by the Insurance Rating Board and
the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau under date of May 1, 1966. Prior to that date there
had been a number of earlier endorsements promulgated by the Board and Bureau. A
convenient source for the full text of the general endorsement is W.F. YOUNG, CASFS AND
MATERIALS ON INSURANcE 704-07 (1971).
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applicable to most New Jersey motorists. As our examination will show,
the way in which those problems and questions have been dealt with
elsewhere will be suggestive of the way in which they will be handled
in New Jersey.

II.

THE BASIC COVERAGE CONCEPT OF THE ENDORSEMENT

The fundamental coverage provision of the Endorsement is that:
"The Company will pay all sums which the Insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily
injury or property damage, caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle .... -44 The coverage applies to the person named as the insured
in the automobile liability policy to which the Endorsement is attached,
and, while residents of the same household, to the spouse and relatives
of the named insured. 45 The coverage also applies to any person other
than the named insured, his spouse and relatives, while occupying an
insured vehicle, 48 and to certain derivative claims that other persons
might have because of bodily injury sustained by the named insured,
his spouse or relatives, or by an occupant of an insured vehicle. 47 An
insured vehicle within the meaning of the Endorsement is a vehicle
designated as an owned vehicle in the automobile liability policy to
which the Endorsement is attached, provided that the same is registered
48
or principally garaged in New Jersey.
Note that coverage is restricted to sums which the insured is legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle. This phrase effectively imports into the Endorsement all the normal rules governing tort liability and damages. 49
Accordingly, in order to collect under the Endorsement, the insured
must be able to prove an automobile tort case against the uninsured
motorist. Furthermore the coverage applicable to the named insured
and to his spouse and relatives while they are living with him is not
restricted to periods while they are occupying a vehicle which is insured
44 Appendix, Endorsement § I.
45 Id. § 11(a).

40 Id. § II(b).
47 Id. § 11(c).

48 Id. Preamble-Description of Insured Vehicles.
49 See Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968); DeLuca v.
Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966).
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under the Endorsement. They may recover for injuries sustained while
riding in some other vehicle or while a pedestrain. 50
III.

ARBITRATION

UNDER THE ENDORSEMENT

The arbitration provision of the Endorsement states:
If any person making claim hereunder and the Company do not
agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of
bodily injury or property damage to the Insured, or do not agree
as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this
insurance, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or
matters upon which such person and the Company do not agree
shall be settled by arbitration .... 51

The Endorsement also provides that arbitration shall be in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, unless the
parties agree upon some other means of conducting the artibration, and
that the claimant and the company shall each be bound by the arbitra52
tion award.
Whenever there is an arbitration provision in a contract, there is
always a question as to the scope of the provision. To put it another
way, what matters are covered by the arbitration provision? The
arbitration language of the New Jersey Endorsement is identical to that
in use in almost all of the other states 53 and there have been many
reported cases dealing with the scope of the arbitration required by
that language. All states agree that the arbitrator has the power to
decide at least the question of the liability of the uninsured motorist
and the question of the amount of damages. 54 Most states hold that
those two issues, liability of the uninsured motorist and damages, are
the only two issues to be decided by arbitration.5 5 However, there can
50 See Lopez v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 210, 58 Cal. Rptr. 243
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bittler, 14 Ohio Misc. 23, 235 N.E.2d 745
(1968).

51 Appendix, Endorsement § VI F.
52 Id.
53 Compare text of Endorsement § VI F (Appendix) with text of general Endorsement § VI F, as reproduced in W.F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE at 706

(1971).
54 The language of section VI F of the Endorsement (Appendix) dearly so provides,
and no case has been found in any jurisdiction which did not allow arbitration on at least
those two issues.
55 See Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N.E.2d 149 (1968); Western
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Strange, 3 Mich. App. 733, 143 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1966); Rosenbaum
v. American Sur. Co. of N.Y., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
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be many other matters at issue besides liability and damages. For
example, such matters as the existence of any insurance contract, the
status of the claimant as an insured under the policy, the uninsured
status of the alleged tortfeasor, lack of notice, the running of a statute of
limitations, and the validity of disclaimers frequently arise between a
claimant and the insurer. As stated above, most states hold that these
matters which, broadly speaking, deal with coverage issues are not subject to decision by the arbitrator but must be resolved by resort to the
courts. However, some states permit the arbitrator to decide the wide
range of coverage issues as well as the issues of liability of the uninsured and damages.56 The most straightforward meaning of the arbitration provision of the Endorsement, particularly when read in light of
the references to arbitration contained in the basic coverage provision 7
of the Endorsement, seems to be that the arbitrator is limited to determining the liability of the uninsured and to damages. This writer
anticipates that the New Jersey courts will follow the general rule and
will limit the authority of the arbitrator to the issues of liability of the
uninsured and damages.
However, even in jurisdictions in which the basic authority of the
arbitrator under the uninsured motorists endorsement is limited to tort
liability and damages, the parties may, by agreement in the specific
case, broaden his authority so that he may decide other matters. They
may do this by express agreement to broaden the arbitrator's authority
or simply by the act of submitting issues to the arbitrator for decision. 58
A party who does not protest when originally non-arbitrable issues are
submitted to the arbitrator may find, if he later attempts to contest
the matter in court, that he is deemed to have agreed to the submission,
or, alternatively, that he is deemed to have waived his right to have
those matters decided by the court.5 9 There are no reported cases in
56 See Esparza v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 257 Cal. App. 2d 496, 65 Cal. Rptr.
245 (Ct. App. 1968); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 433 Pa. 250,
248 A.2d 842 (1969); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A.2d 655 (1968).
57 Appendix, Endorsement § I.
58 For the right to determine by express agreement, the terms and scope of arbitration,
see American Arbitration Association, Accident Claims Rules § 6 (Jan. 1, 1971) (hereinafter cited as AAA Accident Claims Rules); American Arbitration Association, A Manual
for Accident Claims Arbitrators, at 3, par. 2b (hereinafter cited as AAA Manual). See also
Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 148 A.2d 497 (App. Div. 1959); Mitchell v. Alfred
Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 396, 137 A.2d 569 (App. Div. 1958). For broadening of authority by action of submitting to arbitration and participating in arbitration, see Collingswood Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Wkrs., 28 N.J. Super. 605, 611,
101 A.2d 372, 375 (Ch. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 31 N.J. Super. 466, 107 A.2d 43
(App. Div. 1954).
59 Collingswood Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Wkrs., 28 N.J.
Super. 605, 611, 101 A.2d 372, 375 (Ch. 1953).
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New Jersey dealing with submissions to an arbitrator under the Endorsement, but there is at least one New Jersey case dealing with other
types of arbitration that indicate that it is possible to give an arbitrator
power to decide an originally non-arbitrable matter simply by participating without protest in an arbitration proceeding in which one
of the parties submits the matter for decision by the arbitrator. 60 The
moral for the practitioner is clear: If there is a non-arbitrable issue in
dispute between the claimant and the company and if arbitration of
that issue is not desired by the client, that issue should be submitted to
61
a court for determination before any arbitration proceedings are held.
In 1923, New Jersey became one of the first states to adopt a
modern arbitration statute. This statute governs all arbitration occurring within New Jersey, including, of course, that arising under the
Endorsement. Consequently, in seeking to ascertain the rules and
principles which are applicable to arbitrations pursuant to the Endorsement, one must look not only to the language of the Endorsement and
to the rules of the AAA, but also to the provisions of the arbitration
statute.
The Endorsement is, among other things, a written contract to
submit certain types of disputes to arbitration, and the New Jersey
statute clearly establishes the legal validity and enforceability of a
written contract to submit disputes to arbitration.6 2 New Jersey courts
have repeatedly upheld the plain meaning and the validity of the
statute and have indicated in many cases that arbitration is a favored
method of resolving disputes.63 In a few states the arbitration provisions
of the standard uninsured motorist endorsement have been viewed with
some hostility by the courts, 64 but, in view of New Jersey's long history
of favorable treatment of agreements to arbitrate, it is not likely that
New Jersey courts will be reluctant to enforce the arbitration provisions
of the Endorsement.
In the typical case where coverage is conceded and the only
matters at issue are the legal liability of the uninsured motorist and the
amount of damages, the arbitration procedures to be followed are
simple and relatively speedy. Either the claimant or the insurance
company may initiate the arbitration. 65 Usually, it is the claimant rather
60 Id.

el

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (1952).
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (1952).

63 See Local Union 560 v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J. Super. 219, 230 A.2d 521 (App.
Div. 1967); Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J. Super. 157, 148 A.2d 497 (App. Div. 1959); Eastern
Engineering Co. v. Ocean City, 11 N.J. Misc. 508, 167 A. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
04 See Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606 (1969).
05 AAA Manual, supra note 58, at 3, par, 2a.
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than the insurer who initiates the arbitration, because, where negotiations fail to produce agreement, the typical insurer simply withholds
payment and places the burden of proceeding upon the claimant.8 8 The
party initiating the arbitration does so by serving a Demand for Arbitration upon the other party, and by filing copies of the Demand and a
67
copy of the applicable Endorsement with a regional office of the AAA.
When filing the Demand with the AAA, the initiating party pays an
initial administrative fee of $50.00, which is non-refundable.6 8 The
Demand for Arbitration is a simple one page form which has been
developed by the AAA for use in uninsured motorist cases. 69
When the AAA receives the Demand, it acknowledges receipt
thereof to both parties. 70 The party upon whom the Demand is served
may, but need not, file an answering statement. If no answering statement is filed, the party is deemed to have denied the claim.71 Cases
arising under the Endorsement are heard by a single arbitrator who is
appointed by the AAA from its Accident Claims Panel. 72 The Panel
is composed of attorneys who practice in the field of automobile negligence law. A case arising under the New Jersey Endorsement would
normally be heard by a New Jersey practitioner who had volunteered
his services as an arbitrator to the AAA. 73 A list of possible arbitrators is submitted to both parties by an AAA staff member, and an
attempt is made to appoint an arbitrator who is mutually acceptable
to the parties. If the parties are unable to agree, the AAA appoints
an arbitrator in accordance with its own judgment as to suitability,
74
but the appointment is subject to challenge for reasonable cause.
After an arbitrator has been appointed, an AAA staff member
consults with the parties as to their preferences regarding the time and
place for the arbitration hearing, and the time and place for the hearing are then fixed by the arbitrator. 75 Discovery procedures are not
available in arbitration proceedings but certain limited discovery-type
devices are available. Under the terms of the Endorsement, the insurer
66 Id.
67 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 4.
68 AAA Interview, supra note 40. See AAA Accident Claims Rules §§ 30, 33 and attached Administrative Fee Schedule. If he desires to recover this fee the claimant can
specify the amount as an element of his damages.
69 Form ACI--40M-1-70, American Arbitration Association, Demand for Arbitration.
70 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 4.
71 Id.
72 Id. § 8.
78 AAA Interview, supra note 40.
74 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 8.
75 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 10; AAA Manual, supra note 58, at 6, par. 1.
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may require the claimant to furnish a sworn proof of claim, to submit
himself to physical examination, and to make damaged property available to the insurer for inspection. 76 Under the provisions of the New
Jersey arbitration statute, the arbitrator may compel the attendance of
witnesses by subpoena, and he may also compel witnesses to produce
relevant documents at the arbitration hearing.77 An AAA arbitrator
will routinely issue a subpoena upon request of any party.
The arbitration hearing itself is much like the trial of an ordinary
civil action before a judge sitting without a jury. There are usually
opening statements by counsel for the parties, the presentation of proofs
and witnesses by the claimant, the presentation of proofs and witnesses
by the insurance company and closing arguments. 78 Witnesses are subject to cross-examination, 79 and the arbitrator must make his award
within 30 days after the close of the hearing.8 0 The award must be in
writing, signed by the arbitrator and acknowledged or proved in the
same manner as a deed for the conveyance of real estate."' Copies of the
award are then sent to all parties or to their attorneys.8 2 In making an
award the arbitrator may, but need not, give the reasons for his decision. 82 Usually arbitrators do not state their reasons for making an
8 4
award in cases arising under uninsured motorists endorsements.
Despite the broad similarity between court trials and hearings
before an arbitrator, there are important ways in which the two proceedings differ. The arbitration hearing is somewhat more informal
and is usually shorter in duration than a comparable trial. The typical
Endorsement arbitration takes less than one day to hear. 5 Arbitration
hearings are not open to the public. The only persons who have a right
to be present throughout the hearing are the parties and their attorneys.8 6 Witnesses, other than parties, may be excluded when not actu76 Appendix, Endorsement § VI B.
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-6 (1952).
78 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 18.
79 Id. Note indication that if witnesses are presented by either party they "shall submit
to questions or other examination." See AAA Manual, supra note 58, at 8.
80 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 28.
81 Id. § 29. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (1952).
82 AAA Accident Claims Rules § 32.
83 AAA Manual at 13. See L'Manian v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524,
236 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1967).
84 AAA Interview, supra note 40.
85 Id. It should be noted that the whole arbitration process is considerably more swift
than the normal judicial process in New Jersey. Hearings can be, and frequently.are, held
within two or three months of the date of the Demand for Arbitration. They are rarely
held later than six months after the date of the Demand.
86 AAA Accident Claims Rules, §§ 11 & 14.
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ally testifying, and observers or spectators may be excluded entirely, if
the arbitrator so wishes.8 7 A stenographic record is not required, but
the AAA will make arrangements for such a record at the request of
one or more of the parties, and the requesting party or parties must
pay for the stenographer.88 The rules of evidence differ significantly
from those of the courtroom. The arbitrator is the judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered and the rules of the AAA
state specifically that "conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary." 8 9 The AAA manual for accident claims informs the arbitrator that awards are subject to attack more frequently when the arbitrator refuses to hear material and pertinent evidence than when he
listens to testimony that may not be relevant. 90 Consequently, the
manual advises the arbitrator to accept doubtful material "for what it
is worth," with the arbitrator then discounting irrelevant or untrustworthy testimony.91 Affidavits may be presented in lieu of personal
testimony, subject, of course, to discounting because of the absence of
cross-examination, and physicians' testimony frequently is taken in
92
affidavit form.
Any party to the arbitration may, within 3 months after the award
is delivered to him, apply, in a summary proceeding, to any court of
record in the state for confirmation, vacation, modification, or correction of the award.93 If the award is confirmed, it has the status of a
judgment of the confirming court. 94 The grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award are specified in the arbitration statute, and they are
very limited: An award may be vacated where it was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrator; where the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing or in refusing to hear
evidence which was pertinent and material to the controversy; where
the arbitrator was guilty of "other misbehaviours prejudicial to the
rights of any party"; or where the arbitrator exceeded or so imperfectly
executed his powers that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
matters submitted was not made. 95

Grounds for correction of an arbitrator's award by the court are
87 Id. § 14.
88 Id. § 12.
89
90
91
92

Id. § 20.

AAA Manual, supra note 58, at 9, par. 9.
Id.

AAA Accident Claims Rules § 21. AAA Manual at 9, par. 9.
§ 2A:24-7 (1952).
§ 2A:24-10 (1952).
§ 2A:24-8 (1952).

93 N.J. STAT. ANN.
94 N.J. STAT. ANN.
95 N.J. STAT. ANN.
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even more limited and amount to a right to correct obvious errors of
a more or less clerical nature.96 An arbitrator's award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator made a mistake of law or
fact.97 Courts are very reluctant to upset an award made by an arbitrator
and, all things considered, an arbitrator's award is generally much more
difficult to upset than is the judgment of a trial court. 98
IV.

OBTAINING JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE ISSUES

Any dispute between the claimant under an allegedly existing
Endorsement and the insurance company, other than a dispute over
liability of the uninsured motorist or the amount of damages, may be
broadly described as a dispute concerning a coverage issue. As noted
above, coverage issues are to be determined by the court rather than
by the arbitrator. There are several ways in which, procedurally speaking, coverage issues can be presented to the court.
There are at least two courses open to a claimant under an Endorsement who is unable to negotiate a successful settlement because
the insurer raises coverage questions. One course would be to institute
an action in the superior court in which he would seek declaratory
relief with respect to the coverage issues, 99 plus relief under the arbitration statute in the form of a judgment compelling the insurance company to submit to arbitration. 0 0 This procedural course should be followed by the claimant when he has an affirmative interest in having
a given coverage issue decided by the court rather than by the arbitrator. The other course open to the claimant would be to serve and file
a Demand for Arbitration without first seeking judicial relief. The
efficacy of this second course depends greatly upon the reaction of the
AAA and the insurer to the demand. One possible result of this procedure is that it may result in empowering the arbitrator to decide the
coverage issues. 101 Keeping in mind the fact that a reviewing court or
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-9 (1952).
Newark Stereotypers', Local 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 261 F. Supp. 832
(D.N.J. 1966); Bell v. Price, 22 N.J.L. 578 (Ct. Err. & App. 1849); Carpenter v. Bloomer,
54 N.J. Super. 157, 148 A.2d 497 (App. Div. 1959); Collingswood Hosiery Mills, Inc. v.
American Fed'n of Hosiery Wkrs., 28 N.J. Super. 605, 101 A.2d 372 (Ch. 1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 31 N.J. Super. 466, 107 A.2d 43 (App. Div. 1954).
98 See cases cited note 97 supra. See also Deakman v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n, 110
N.J.L. 304, 164 A. 256 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
96

"7

99

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 2A:16-53, -54 (1952).

100 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-3 (1952).
101 This could happen if the insurer and the insured were to raise the coverage
issues before the arbitrator.
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an appellate court cannot overturn an arbitrator's award because of a
mere mistake of law,' 0 2 this may or may not make sense under all the
circumstances of the case. In any event, the claimant who makes a
Demand for Arbitration in the face of unresolved coverage issues, simultaneously poses problems for and opens options to the insurer.
The simplest response to a Demand for Arbitration would be for
the insurer to abandon its coverage position and proceed with arbitration as to the uninsured motorist's liability and damages. Presumably,
this would happen only in those cases in which the insurer had raised the
coverage issues as a negotiating ploy without being really serious about
them. In such a case, the serving of the Demand would amount to a successful calling of the insurer's bluff, with the result that the parties could
proceed to the meaningful issues of the uninsured motorist's liability
and damages. However, a more common case would be one in which
the insurer was serious about the coverage issues. In such a case there
are at least four options open to the insurance company:
(1) The insurer notifies the claimant and the AAA that it denies
coverage and refuses to particpate in the arbitration.
(2) The insurer agrees to participate in the arbitration and couples
this with an explicit offer that the arbitrator decide the coverage issues.
(3) The insurer proceeds with arbitration on the issues of the uninsured motorist's liability and damages, subject to an express
refusal to submit coverage questions to the arbitrator and
subject to an express reservation of rights in regard to coverage issues.
(4) The insurer commences a court action seeking a judicial determination of the coverage issues, and, as an incident thereto,
requests the court to enjoin the arbitration proceeding until
the coverage issues are judicially determined.
If the first option is taken, the insurer is safe so long as the AAA
refuses to go forward with the arbitration. If the AAA did refuse to
proceed with the arbitration, then the claimant would have to commence a court action under the arbitration statute to compel arbitra-

tion, and, in that action, the insurer could raise its coverage issues.
However, if the AAA came to a preliminary conclusion that an insurance contract containing an arbitration clause was in existence, it
03
could proceed with the arbitration in the absence of the insurer.

102 See cases cited notes 97 & 98 supra.
103 AAA Accident Claims Rules, supra note 58, at § 19. See Battle v. General Cellulose
Co., 23 N.J. 538, 129 A.2d 865 (1957).
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If the arbitration proceeded and if the insurer persisted in its refusal
to participate, the insurer would be putting itself into an extremely
vulnerable position. The claimant's chance of obtaining a favorable
award would be greatly enhanced by the absence of any defense, and
the only way in which the insurer could prevent the award from being
reduced to an enforceable judgment would be by seeking to vacate
the award pursuant to the provisions of the arbitration statute.
Coverage issues probably could be presented to the court at the
judicial hearing dealing with the confirmation or vacation of the
award, 10 4 but it would be foolish indeed for the insurer to let matters
get so far before seeking judicial determination of the coverage issues.
If the court decided, at the hearing on the confirmation or vacation
of the award, to vacate the award because of a meritorious coverage
issue raised by the insurer, all would be well for the insurer. But, if
the court decided against the insurer on the coverage issues, then the
award would be confirmed, and the insurer would have forfeited its
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the uninsured motorist's
liability and on the merits of the damages question. 10 5 All in all, it is
hard to imagine that an insurance company would exercise the first
option, at least once it knew that the AAA was going to proceed with
the arbitration.
If the second option is taken (the insurer agrees to participate in
the arbitration and couples this with an explicit offer that the arbitrator
decide the coverage issues), the procedural course to be followed then
depends upon the claimant. If the claimant accepts the offer to let the
arbitrator decide the coverage issues, then the arbitrator would have
the power and right to decide those issues. 10 Giving the arbitrator such
power effectively precludes judicial determination of the coverage issues
at any later stage of the case, because, as noted above, an arbitrator's
award cannot be vacated on the ground that he made a mistake of law
in deciding the coverage question. 0 7 On the other hand, if the claimant
refused to accept the insurer's offer to let the arbitrator decide the
coverage issues, the situation would be comparable to either a first or
a third option situation, depending upon whether the insurer withdrew
from the arbitration or whether the arbitration proceeded subject to a
reservation of rights on the coverage issues. One can conceive of cases
where it would be sensible for the parties to give the arbitrator unreviewable power to decide the coverage issues, but it is to be anticipated
See Battle v. General Cellulose Co., 23 N.J. 538, 129 A.2d 865 (1957).
105 Id.
106 This would then amount to a submission by agreement. See note 58 supra.
107 See cases cited notes 97 & 98 supra.
104
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that in the normal case where there were serious coverage issues, the
average practitioner would be hesitant about conferring such power
on the arbitrator.
The third option (the insurer proceeds with the arbitration on the
issues of the uninsured motorist's liability and damages, subject to an
express refusal to submit coverage questions and subject to an express
reservation of rights in that regard) might appear attractive to an insurer which believed it had a good case on the liability and damages
issues. The thought here would be that if the insurer did well in the
arbitration proceedings, in terms of the outcome regarding liability
and damages, it would simply live with the award and save itself the
trouble and expense of a judicial determination of the coverage issues.
If the arbitration turned out badly for the insurer, it could then
present the coverage issues to a court pursuant to its reservation of
rights. The trouble with this approach is that it can be rendered useless by a judicial application of "waiver" concepts to the arbitration
proceeding. "Waiver," as a basic concept, is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 10 8 But, "waiver," as it lives in the cases, particularly when it gets confused with "estoppel," is not a simple concept,
and there are many cases where "waiver" is applied to situations where
there is no actual intent to relinquish. 09 In short, despite an explicit
reservation of rights regarding coverage issues, it is distinctly possible
that the actual conduct of the arbitration hearing might be deemed
to be a "waiver" of a party's right to have a judicial determination of
the coverage issues. 10 In other words, despite the conceptual plausibility
See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1751-52 (4th ed. 1951).
109 For application of "waiver" in non-arbitration situations which are suggestive of
the difficulties an insurer might encounter in attempting to reserve rights pending an
arbitration, see Ebert v. Baiter, 83 N.J. Super. 545, 200 A.2d 532 (Union County Ct. 1964),
(where the insurer was held to have waived coverage defense despite an agreement purporting expressly to reserve coverage defenses). See also Bruni v. Prudential Ins. Co., 51
N.J. 408, 241 A.2d 449 (1968), adopting dissenting opinion of Carton, J. who sat below,
100 N.J. Super. 154, 159, 241 A.2d 455, 457 (App. Div. 1967) (court held insurer may have
waived right to require filing of reinstatement agreement despite repeated history in this
particular case of insistence upon compliance with reinstatemnt procedures); Magna Mfg.
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 142, 18 A.2d 565 (Ch. 1941) (an insurer by
participating in an insurance industry plan to supply workmen's compensation insurance
for difficult risks was held to have waived its right to cancel a policy issued pursuant to
the plan, although it clearly did not intend such a waiver).
110 The basic problem for the insurer is that in "waiver" cases the courts have rather
consistently said, and probably properly so, for the most part, that "actions speak louder
than words." The course of conduct of the insurer is often more important than the words
or instruments by which it tries to reserve its rights. See Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962). Consequently, there is always the danger that
the actual way in which the insurer prepares for an arbitration or the actual manner in
108

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3: 19

of an arbitration subject to a reservation of rights on coverage issues,
the way in which "waiver" operates in judicial practice makes it significantly possible that the reservation will be ineffective.
The fourth option (the insurer commences a court action seeking
a judicial determination of the coverage issues, and, as an incident
thereto, requests the court to enjoin the arbitration proceeding until
the coverage issues are judicially determined) is the only way in which
the insurer, who has serious coverage questions, can be certain of getting
full judicial determination of those questions. This "full judicial determination" includes the right to a full-fledged review by an appellate
court in cases where a party believes that the trial court erred.
The preceding discussion of the various ways in which coverage
issues may be presented to the courts is not exhaustive. Hopefully,
however, it is sufficiently full to demonstrate that a party---claimant or
insurer-who wishes to obtain full judicial determination of a coverage issue arising under the Endorsement should seek that judicial
determination before any arbitration hearing is held.
V.

TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE ENDORSEMENT

Coverage under the Endorsement applies to accidents which occur
within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or
Canada."' This contrasts markedly with the protection afforded under
the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, since payments from
the Fund may be made only with respect to accidents occurring within
the State of New Jersey. 112 Although the situs of the accident would
normally determine what body of tort law the arbitrator should apply
to the liability and damages aspects of the accident, 113 there is no requirement that the arbitration would be held in the state in which
the accident occurred." 4 The claimant, in his Demand for Arbitration,
which it conducts an arbitration may be inconsistent with, and override, a purported
reservation of rights.
111 Appendix, Endorsement § IV.
112 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (Supp. 1971-72).
118 Since the arbitrator's basic task is to determine legal liability with respect to the

accident, he must apply normal legal rules, including choice of law rules, to the accident.
Applicable choice of law rules would normally determine the rights and wrongs of the
accident itself in accordance with the law of the state in which the accident occurred,
though questions of status and coverage under a New Jersey endorsement would probably
be determined by judges not arbitrators under New Jersey law. See Mellk v. Sarahson, 49
N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967).
114 AAA Accident Claims Rules, supra note 58, at § 7; AAA Manual, supra note 58,
at 6, par. 1.
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usually requests that the arbitration be held in the state of the claimant's residence and that request is usually honored."t5
VI.

TIME

LIMITATIONS OF THE ENDORSEMENT

The policy period of the Endorsement is coterminous with that
of the basic liability policy to which the Endorsement is attached. 116
Consequently, the Endorsement coverage applies to all accidents occuring within the time limits defined by the period of the basic liability policy.
The Endorsement incorporates by reference the notice provisions of
the basic liability policy to which it is attached."17 The notice provision used in most New Jersey automobile liability policies states that:
"In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice . . .
shall be given by or for the Insured to the Company or any of its
authorized agents as soon as practicable." Although particular insurers
may vary the time requirements for notice in their policies, there is
an overriding statutory provision which protects the insured so long as
he gives notice "as soon as was reasonably possible." 118
The New Jersey courts have treated the phrases "as soon as practicable" and "as soon as reasonably possible" as being equivalent. 119
Depending upon the existence of circumstances deemed to be extenuating, the New Jersey courts, when construing automobile liability
policies and other types of liability policies, have found notice to be
timely even when given months after the accident. 20 The safest practice, of course, is for the insured or the claimant to give notice of the
accident on the same day on which it occurs, or if that cannot be
done, then within one or two days thereafter. But the practitioner
frequently has no contact with the insured until a relatively long period after the accident and he sometimes discovers that notice was not
115 AAA Interview, supra note 40; AAA Accident Claims Rules § 7.
116 Appendix, Endorsement § IV.
117 Id. § VI A.
118 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-2 (1970).

119 Figueroa v. Puter, 84 N.J. Super. 349, 202 A.2d 195 (App. Div. 1964); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 95 N.J. Super. 142, 230 A.2d 179 (Ch. 1967); Velkers v. Glen Falls Ins.
Co., 93 N.J. Super. 501, 226 A.2d 448 (Ch. 1967), afj'd, 98 N.J. Super. 166, 236 A.2d 408
(App. Div. 1967).
120 Vassilakis v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 96, 237 A.2d 875 (1968) (eight months);
Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) (almost 24
months); Bass v. Allstate Ins. Co., 77 N.J. Super. 491, 187 A.2d 28 (App. Div. 1962) (two
months); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 N.J. Super. 142, 230 A.2d 179 (Ch. 1967) (six
months).
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given as soon as he would have liked. He is then put in the position
of making the best of a difficult notice situation. The New Jersey
notice cases, in general, are fairly strict in enforcing notice requirements, but there are enough cases dispensing with strict compliance
with notice requirements to make a practitioner cautious about declining to press a claim or seeking protection because of delayed
2
notice.' '
It should be noted that there is nothing in the notice provision
of the Endorsement or of the standard automobile liability policy which
requires notice of a particular type of claim to be given to the insurer
"as soon as practicable" or "as soon as reasonably possible." The only
notice required is notification of the accident, its time, place and circumstances, and notice of the names and addresses of injured parties
and witnesses. This is significant, because the typical automobile owner
or driver is reasonably well aware of the need, for defensive liability
purposes, of giving notice to his insurance company, and the chances
are that he will give prompt notice of the accident to his insurer even
though he receives no specific legal advice to do so. On the other hand,
the typical owner, driver or passenger might well not even think about
uninsured motorist protection until after he has consulted his lawyer.
The practitioner handling an uninsured motorist claim should give
notice of the particular claim himself, if that has not already been
done, and he should also take the position that any notice of the accident given to the insurer for defensive liability purposes (or for collision or medical benefit purposes) inures to the benefit of any subsequent
claimant under the Endorsement.

122

The notice requirements under the Endorsement compare interestingly with those of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law.
The Fund Law requires that notice of a claim be given within 90 days
124
of the accident 123 (or within 15 days of a disclaimer of insurance),'
121 For a sampling of rather strict notice cases, see Figueroa v. Puter, 84 N.J. Super.
349, 202 A.2d 195 (App. Div. 1964); Miller v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 36
N.J. Super. 288, 115 A.2d 597 (App. Div. 1955); Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. A.E.A. Co., 32
N.J. Super. 471, 108 A.2d 464 (App. Div. 1954). For a sampling of cases excusing delayed
notice, see cases cited note 120 supra. Note too, the statements in many cases to the effect
that absence of knowledge of insurance coverage is a factor to be considered in evaluating
compliance with notice requirements. See Mariani v. Bender, 85 N.J. Super. 490, 205 A.2d
323 (App. Div. 1964); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 N.J. Super. 142, 230 A.2d 179 (Ch.
1967); Capece v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 N.J. Super. 462, 207 A.2d 207 (L. Div. 1965). The
coverage provided under the endorsement is new in New Jersey and it will probably take
several years before insureds become fully aware of its existence and scope.
122 See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anziano, 59 Misc. 2d 673, 300 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (Supp. 1971-72).
124 Id. (savings clause (b)).
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25
and those limits have been rather strictly enforced by the courts.1
Under the Fund Law a claimant could always be sure of having at
least 90 days within which to give notice of a claim, but, except in a
disclaimer situation, a claimant could almost never get more than 90
days. However, under the Endorsement, a claimant cannot and should
not count on having 90 days to give notice, but he can possibly get
more than 90 days,126 depending upon the circumstances.
The Endorsement has special notice requirements with respect to
hit-and-run accidents. These are that the insured shall report the accident within 48 hours to the police, a judicial officer, or the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and that the insured shall file with the insurer
within 30 days a statement under oath setting forth the facts giving
rise to a claim against a person or persons whose identity cannot be
ascertained. 127 The claimant is, prima facie, bound by these short notice
requirements, but the notice requirements are affected by the statutory
provision that,

failure to give any notice required to be given by the policy within
the time specified therein shall not invalidate any claim made by
the insured if it is shown not to have been reasonably possible
to give the notice within the prescribed time and that notice was
128
given as soon as was reasonably possible.
The Endorsement requires that proof of claim, under oath if required by the insurer, shall be filed with the insurer "as soon as practicable." The duty to file a proof of claim does not effectively arise
until the insurance company requests that it be filed after having re129
ceived notice of a claim.
After the time requirements regarding notice and proof of claim
have been met, there remains the statute of limitations problem regarding the time within which an action must be prosecuted if not settled
by negotiation. So far as the Endorsement is concerned, the critical
time for statute of limitations purposes is probably the date upon which
a Demand for Arbitration is made, not the date of filing a complaint
with a court. 3 0 So far as the underlying tort claim is concerned, the
125 Danisi v. Thuemling, 72 N.J. Super. 118, 178 A.2d 26 (App. Div. 1962); Szczesny
v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. Super. 347, 177 A.2d 47 (App. Div. 1962); Keith v. Petrakakas, 95 N.J.
Super. 262, 230 A.2d 543 (L. Div.), af'd, 98 N.J. Super. 153, 236 A.2d 402 (App. Div. 1967).
126 See cases cited notes 120 & 121 supra.
127 Appendix, Endorsement § V.
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-2 (1970).

129 The language of the "Proof of Claim" section of the Endorsement, § VI B,
(Appendix) clearly contemplates that the insurer will request a formal proof of claim,
when it wants one, and that it will furnish forms for that purpose to the insured.
130 See DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 42,
268 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966).
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applicable time limitations are 2 years for bodily injury's' and 6 years
for damage to property. 3 2 Since the basic coverage concept of the Endorsement is that the insurer "will pay all sums which the Insured or
his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle,"' 1s8 it
would seem logical to apply to the claimant under the Endorsement
the same statutory limitation which is applicable to his underlying
cause of action agailnst the uninsured motorist. To put it another way,
if the statute of limitations bars the bringing of an action against the
uninsured motorist, then the claimant should be barred from collecting
under the Endorsement on the theory that he is no longer "legally
entitled to recover" from the uninsured motorist. However, the courts
in other jurisdictions have not reasoned that way. They have tended to
regard the claimant's claim against the insurer under an uninsured
motorists' endorsement as being purely contractual and they have usually applied the statute of limitations for contract actions to cases
arising under uninsured motorists' endorsements. 3 4 Since the limitation on contract actions is usually longer than that on bodily injury
actions, the result has been to extend the time for bringing claims
under the uninsured motorists' endorsements. If New Jersey follows the
emerging rule elsewhere, the effect will be to subject all claims under
the Endorsement to a 6-year period, thus extending, in effect, the
35
statutory limit on bodily injury claims by 4 full years.'
VII.

COOPERATION OF THE CLAIMANT

The claimant under the Endorsement is required to cooperate
with the insurer by way of not doing anything which would impair
the claimant's underlying cause of action against the uninsured motorist. One of the exclusionary provisions of the Endorsement states that
the insurance does not apply,
to bodily injury or property damage with respect to which the
Insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to payment
under this insurance shall, without written consent of the Com131 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952).
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (Supp. 1971-72).
133 Appendix, Endorsement § I.
134 See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Corp. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968); DeLuca
v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966).
135 Contract arguments are governed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (Supp. 1971-72),
which sets a six year limit.
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pany, make any settlement with any person or organization who
136
may be legally liable therefor.
More affirmatively, there is also a requirement that the insurer
may require the claimant "to take such action as may be necessary or
appropriate to preserve his right to recover damages from any person

or organization alleged to be legally responsible for the bodily injury or
property damage .... 137 There is another provision requiring the
insured to give the insurer notice of any action which he brings against
any party (whether or not that party is the uninsured motorist) in connection with the accident. 138 Finally, there is an elaborate trust agreement provision which has the effect of subrogating the insurer, after
payment of the claim under the Endorsement, to the insured's rights
against the uninsured motorist and of requiring the insured to assist
the insurer to recover against the uninsured motorist, if the insurer
so requests. 139
Considering the whole package of provisions mentioned above,
it is clear that they subject the insured to a duty to cooperate with the
insurer which is at least as great as that imposed by the liability protection provisions and the collision damage provisions of the basic
automobile policy. It is also clear that they create for the insurer subrogation rights which are comparable to those arising under the collision
damages provisions of the basic automobile policy or under standard
fire insurance or property loss policies. New Jersey courts have been
reasonably protective of the rights of insurers under assistance and cooperation clauses 140 and under subrogation provisions' 4' of other types
of insurance, and, presumably, they will be equally protective of such
rights under the Endorsement.

VIII.

OFFSETS AGAINST PAYMENTS UNDER THE ENDORSEMENT

The Endorsement states that any amount otherwise payable to
the claimant shall be reduced by all sums paid to the claimant by the
owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle or by any other person
jointly or severally liable with the uninsured motorist for the claimant's
Appendix, Endorsement § I, Exclusions (a).
Id. § VI C.
188 Id. § VI D.
139 Id. § VI G.
140 Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (Ct. Err. & App.
1938); Sutera v. Provident Ins. Co., 67 N.J. Super. 554, 171 A.2d 340 (App. Div. 1961);
Pearl Assurance Co. v. Watts, 58 N.J. Super. 483, 156 A.2d 725 (App. Div. 1959).
141 See Busch v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 54, 234 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1967);
Rogers v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 52 N.J. Super. 254, 145 A.2d 344 (App. Div. 1958).
136

137
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injuries. 142 In view of the fact that the insurer under the Endorsement
is required to stand in the shoes of the uninsured motorist vis-4-vis the
claimant, these provisions create no conceptual or practical problems
since they merely give the insurer the benefit of payments which would
equivalently benefit the uninsured motorist if he were meeting his own
financial responsibilities. Similarly, the Endorsement provision for reducing any payment under the Endorsement by the amount of damages
which the claimant "may be entitled to recover from any person insured
under the bodily injury or property damage liability coverage of the
policy"' 143 presents no problems, because, in effect, it simply gives the
insurer who stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist the benefit
of normal contribution rules.
However, the provisions of the Endorsement reducing the amounts
payable under the Endorsement by payments made under the medical
payments section, and under the collision damages section of the automobile liability policy to which the Endorsement is attached, involve
somewhat different concepts. 44 In the first place, the uninsured motorist, if he were solvent and paid for his own negligence, could not take
advantage of those medical payments or collision payments to reduce
his payments. Secondly, the insured pays for coverage under the medical
payments section and under the collision damages section of his policy
separate and apart from the payment which he makes for coverage
under the Endorsement. Thus, it could be argued that if payment under
one section of the basic automobile policy can be used to offset payment under another, the insured would really be paying two separate
premiums to the insurer for the same protection. On the other hand,
the basic concept of property and liability insurance is indemnity and
the insurance company can plausibly argue that it should not be expected to pay its insured twice for one and the same loss.
The uninsured motorists endorsements in use in most states provide protection for bodily injury only and do not provide coverage for
property damages, so there is little guidance to be found in cases outside New Jersey regarding reductions because of collision payments.
However, there are a number of cases in other jurisdictions dealing
with the right to reduce payments under the Endorsement because of
payments made under the medical benefits section of the policy. Most
states have allowed the insurer to make the reduction,14 5 but some have
142 Appendix, Endorsement § III (c)(1).
143 Id. § III (d).
144 Id. § III (e).
145 Robey v. Northwestern Sec. Ins. Co., 270 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ark. 1967); see
Cannizzo v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 70, 53 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1966); L'Manian v.
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not. 146 This writer anticipates that New Jersey courts will follow the
minority rule because of the desirability of making benefits receivable
under the Endorsement at least equal to benefits receivable from the
Fund. In this connection, it should be noted that a section of the Fund
Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-70 (Supp. 1971-72), was amended by the
Laws of 1958, ch. 98, § 2, in such a way as to remove benefit payments
47
as items to be deducted from payments by the Fund.
Another important payment reduction provision of the Endorsement is the one providing that payments under the Endorsement shall
be reduced by "the amount paid and the present value of all amounts
payable on account of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law.' 148 This provision represents a pure windfall to the insurance company because the uninsured motorist could not reduce his
liability on account of any workmen's compensation benefits which the
insured happened to receive, and also because (unlike the medical and
collision payments reductions) the insurer pays nothing to the insured
by way of workmen's compensation benefits. These considerations have
led the courts of some states to disallow reductions because of workmen's compensation benefits,'1 49 despite the plain language of the provision, but most states which have considered the question, including
such jurisdictions as California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania,
have allowed the reduction. 150 This writer anticipates that New Jersey
courts will follow the majority because of the stature of some of the
other courts which have developed the majority rule, and also by
analogy to the protection afforded under the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund Law, where the Fund has a statutory right to reduce
its payments by the amount of payments received by the claimant under
the workmen's compensation law. 51
It must be said that there is one fundamental and important reason
for permitting all of the reductions specified in the Endorsement. The
American Motorists Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524, 236 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1967); Morgan v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1967).
146 Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 674 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1968);
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968).

147 See Holmberg v. Aten, 68 N.J. Super. 73, 171 A.2d 667 (App. Div. 1961).
148 Appendix, Endorsement § III (c)(2).
149 Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Austin, 202 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1967); Peterson
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
150 Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Allen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. Ct. App. 1966);
Durant v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1965).
151 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-70(a) (Supp. 1971-72) & § 39:6-78(b) (1961).
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reason is that the language of the Endorsement plainly and unambiguously calls for the reductions. When all is said and done, and when
due allowance has been made for the social policy preferences of the
various courts of the nation, there is still much to be said for the basic
proposition that contracts should generally be enforced according to
their terms. Perhaps this is particularly true where the terms of the
contract have received advance approval from a responsible public
official such as the Commissioner of Insurance.
IX.

THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERAGE UNDER MORE THAN
ONE ENDORSEMENT

As noted above, persons insured under the Endorsement include
the named insured, and while residents of the same household, his
spouse and other relatives, and these persons are covered whether or
not they are riding in the vehicle named in the policy. Persons insured
also include anybody riding in the vehicle named in the policy. 152 This
broad definition of persons insured frequently results in one person
being insured under more than one Endorsement. For example, John
Smith, his wife and four children who live with him, are insureds under
his Endorsement wherever they go in the United States and Canada.
If one of the Smiths happens to be riding in Paul Brown's car, and
Brown's car is covered by an Endorsement attached to Brown's basic
automobile policy, he will also be an insured under Brown's Endorsement as long as he stays in Brown's car. If the Brown vehicle becomes
involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist while John Smith
is a passenger in the Brown vehicle, Smith may, on the face of it, have
a claim under both Endorsements. Another example of possible multiple Endorsement coverage is the situation where one person owns two
cars, each of which is separately insured. That person, and the members
of his family who reside with him are, on the face of it, covered by
two Endorsements whenever they ride in either one of the family cars.
As we have seen above, the limits of liability under the Endorsement are $10,000.00 for each person, $20,000.00 for each accident, and
$5,000.00 for property damage in each accident. These limits are relatively low and it can readily be appreciated that they would be inadequate in an accident involving serious personal injury, especially if
the accident involved serious personal injury to three or four persons
riding in the same vehicle. If a seriously injured claimant had injuries
worth, say, $18,000.00 in damages, and if he were, on the face of it,
152 Appendix, Endorsement § II(b).
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an insured under two separate Endorsements, he would certainly like
to "stack" the coverages under the Endorsements so that he could collect his full $18,000.00 rather than be limited to receiving $10,000.00.
The question is: Can he stack?
The relevant language of the Endorsement clearly purports to prevent stacking of coverage. That language is as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an Insured while occupying
a highway vehicle not owned by the Named Insured, this insurance
shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to such Insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary
insurance, and the insurance shall then apply only in the amount
by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the Insured
has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher
of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit
of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance. 153
Since the dollar coverage limits of every Endorsement written in
New Jersey are the same, and since almost every other state has identical dollar limits, and since the endorsements in use in almost every
state have identical language dealing with "other insurance," the "other
insurance" provisions of the Endorsement quoted above would seem to
preclude the $18,000.00 victim from obtaining more than $10,000.00,
no matter how many Endorsements were potentially applicable. Of
course, no resourceful practitioner will abandon an appealing claim
just because of the bald language of an insurance policy. Accordingly,
there have been a number of reported cases in other jurisdictions dealing with attempts to stack coverage. The courts which have considered
the stacking question have divided almost equally. Those courts which
have prohibited stacking have relied both on the express language of
the "other insurance" provision and upon the view that the basic purpose of insurance against uninsured motorists is to put the claimant in
as good a position as he would have been in, had the negligent uninsured motorist had insurance in the minimum amounts required under
the financial responsibility laws.15 4 Stacking, of course, would put the
158 Id. § VI E.
154 Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963); Globe Indem.
Co. v. Baker's Estate, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Miller v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965).
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claimant in a better position than he would have been in against a
minimally insured motorist. Courts which have allowed stacking have
done so either on the basis of manipulating the language of the "other
insurance" provision, or on the basis that where there are two endorsements, each separately paid for, there should be a recovery under both
when the coverage limit of only one of them is inadequate to pay the
damages involved, or on the basis of a combination of these two reasons. 155 Although the division of authority is about equal, the more
recent trend is in favor of stacking. Accordingly, until there has been
a definitive ruling or rulings by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the
New Jersey practitioner dealing with a heavy damage case should seek
recovery under every Endorsement involved.
X.

HIT-AND-RUN

CASES

The typical uninsured motorist case concerns an accident involving
known owners and operators. One of the vehicles is known to be "an
uninsured highway vehicle" in the sense that it is a vehicle:
[W]ith respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which
there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the Insured highway vehicle is
principally garaged, no bodily injury and property damage liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident
with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for
the use of such vehicle, or with respect to which there is a bodily
injury and property damage liability bond or insurance policy
applicable at the time of the accident but the Company writing the
same denies coverage thereunder or is or becomes insolvent. 56
In a hit-and-run case, however, one of the vehicles is unidentified, so
nobody really knows whether it was uninsured in the sense defined
above. To deal with this situation, the Endorsement contains a special
157
provision defining a hit-and-run vehicle as an uninsured vehicle.
Hit-and-run cases are fraught with possibilities of fraud not present
in the ordinary case. Many accidents are "one-car accidents" in which
the driver of a vehicle simply loses control of his car, goes off the road
and strikes a hard object, with resulting bodily injury to occupants of
155 Childers v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. & Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Ark.
1968); Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1966);
Deterding v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 29, 222 N.E.2d 523 (1966);
Sparling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 Ore. 471, 439 P.2d 616 (1968); Smith v. Pacific Auto,
Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965).
156 Appendix, Endorsement § V, "uninsured highway vehicle," cl. (a).
157 Id. § V, "uninsured highway vehicle," cl. (b).
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the car, or damage to the car, or both. The existence of coverage under
the Endorsement clearly poses a temptation to the person involved in
a one-car accident-here is a chance to convert a non-recovery situation
into an insurance paid situation by pretending to have been involved
in a hit-and-run accident.
In an attempt to separate the real hit-and-run case from the fraudulent one-car accident case, the Endorsement contains several special
hit-and-run provisions which are designed to ensure that the alleged
hit-and-run case really happened, and that it did not involve a one-car
accident. This attempt to separate the legitimate claim from the fraudulent one is the basis for the special notice requirement, under which
the accident must be reported to the police, or to a judicial officer, or
to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles within 48 hours. 158 This attempt
is also the basis for the provision in the uninsured motorist endorsement, in use outside of New Jersey, which specifies that there must
have been physical contact between the claimant's vehicle and the hitand-run vehicle. The New Jersey Endorsement differs from the general
uninsured motorist endorsement in that it precludes coverage where
there is no physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, if the accident
occurs outside of New Jersey, but provides coverage for a no physical
contact hit-and-run accident which occurs inside New Jersey, provided
that the facts of the accident can be corroborated by competent evidence other than the testimony of any person having a claim under
the Endorsement arising out of the accident. 159 The requirement of
corroboration for a no contact, hit-and-run accident makes sense as a
general proposition, but there is no logical basis for distinguishing between a no contact, hit-and-run accident inside New Jersey and a no
contact, hit-and-run accident outside New Jersey. The explanation for
the difference between in-state and out-of-state accidents lies in the fact
that the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law permits recovery
in hit-and-run accidents regardless of physical contact. 60 Payments under the Fund Law are restricted to accidents occurring in New Jersey,' 61
so when the Endorsement was adapted for use in New Jersey, the odd
distinction between in-state and out-of-state accidents was incorporated
into the Endorsement to permit claimants under the Endorsement to
have a position equivalent to that of claimants under the Fund for
in-state accidents. So explained, the distinction becomes understandable,
but, nonetheless, the distinction is fundamentally illogical. If a claimant
Id. § V, "hit-and-run vehicle," cl.(b).
Id. § V, "hit-and-run vehicle," d. (d).
16o See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-79 (Supp. 1971-72).
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (Supp. 1971-72).
158
159
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under the Endorsement can convincingly prove that there really was
an accident caused by another car, he should, as a matter of basic principle, be able to collect regardless of whether the accident was in-state
or out-of-state.
One other curious thing to note about hit-and-run coverage under
the Endorsement is that there is no coverage for property damage in
any hit-and-run case, either in-state or out-of-state. 10 2 Again, there is
no logical basis for treating property damage differently from bodily
injury in a hit-and-run case than in any other case (keeping in mind
the fact that under the New Jersey Endorsement a claimant can recover for both bodily injury and property damage in the non-hit-and-run
case). However, the treatment of hit-and-run property damage under the
New Jersey Endorsement corresponds to the treatment of hit-and-run
property damage under the Fund Law, where there is no recovery for
hit-and-run property damage, 163 and it also corresponds to the general
uninsured motorists endorsement in use in other states, where there is
1 64
no property damage coverage at all.
XI.

MISCELLANEOUS MATrERS

It should be noted that the term "bodily injury" under the Endorsement includes death resulting from an accident involving an
uninsured motorist. 165 Consequently, both survival claims and wrongful
death claims can be asserted under the Endorsement.' 6
The Endorsement makes no special provision for the claims of
minors. Presumably, the same rules applicable to contracts involving
minors generally are applicable to the Endorsement. That is to say, the
arbitration provisions of the Endorsement cannot be applied to a minor
without the approval of the court. The question then becomes: Should
court aproval be sought prior to the arbitration hearing in the form
of an order permitting or compelling (depending upon who seeks the
order) the minor to arbitrate, or should there be arbitration without
prior court aproval, followed by special confirmation of the award?
(Note that where there is advance court approval of the arbitration
process, there is no need for special confirmation of the award). Either
162 Appendix, Endorsement § V, "uninsured highway vehicle," cl. (b).
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-78 (1961).
164 See § 1 of general endorsement as printed in W.F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON INSURANCE at 704 (1971).
165 Appendix, Endorsement § V, "bodily injury."
166 Such claims can also be asserted under the Fund Law. N.J. STAT. ANN.
(1971-72).
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course can be followed with propriety, but this writer recommends that
court approval be sought prior to the arbitration proceeding. The
recommendation is made for two reasons. The first is that the AAA
prefers prior approval and usually will not proceed with arbitration of
a minor's claim without court approval, if either party objects. 0 7 The
second reason is that judicial approval of the award after it has made
in some kind of a special confirmation hearing might lead to judicial
second-guessing of the arbitrator. This would be contrary to the entire
spirit of the arbitration statute and would lead to the practical equivalent of multiple litigation of the same claim.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of Chapter 385 of the Laws of 1968 was a salutary
event for the driving and riding public of New Jersey. It placed the
funding of protection against uninsured motorists on a financially
sound basis. The Endorsement adopted pursuant to Chapter 385
provides a vastly more efficient and speedy process for asserting claims
against uninsured motorists.
Under the Endorsement, the arbitrator is empowered to make a
prompt and essentially unreviewable determination regarding liability
and damages in the particular case. Having in mind the nature of the
claims involved, this writer believes that such determination of particular liability and damage issues is desirable from the viewpoint
of economy of time, manpower, and effort, and will probably produce results which are, in substantive terms, at least as just as those
produced by court trials of automobile negligence claims. In addition,
the courts usually determine coverage issues, which means that the
general legal rules applicable to the coverage provided by the Endorsement are settled in full-fledged judicial proceedings, subject to full
review by the appellate courts. This is desirable because it ensures that
particular arbitrations will be held within a framework of reasonably
stable rules of law which are applicable to all cases.
We have seen that the Endorsement as promulgated in New Jersey
generally parallels the form of coverage available in other states. Indeed,
the language of most provisions of the New Jersey Endorsement is
identical with the language used in the uninsured motorists endorsements in force in most other states. However, there are a number of
differences between the New Jersey Endorsement and the form of
coverage in use elsewhere, and these differences have been created for
167 AAA Interview, supra note 40.
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the purpose of making coverage under the Endorsement more compatible with the protection afforded by the New Jersey Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgement Fund Law. For example, the New Jersey
Endorsement, unlike the coverage in most other states, provides compensation for property damage, as does the Fund Law. As another
example, the unusual treatment by the New Jersey Endorsement of the
hit-and-run accident is clearly an attempt to strike a compromise between
provisions of the Fund Law covering hit-and-run accidents in New
Jersey, and the provisions of the uninsured motorists coverage available
in most other states.
This writer anticipates that in construing the language of the New
Jersey Endorsement in situations where it is identical with that of the
general form of coverage, New Jersey courts will follow the rules developed by judicial decisions elsewhere. Where the language of the
New Jersey Endorsement differs from that of the general form of
coverage, New Jersey courts will have to rely upon the specific language
of the New Jersey Endorsement and upon the rather long experience
of New Jersey courts in deciding Fund Law cases. In the few instances
where the draftsmen of the New Jersey Endorsement neglected to
conform its language to match comparable provisions of the Fund Law
-for example, with regard to the deductibility of medical paymentsthe New Jersey courts will probably do some violence to the language
of the Endorsement in order to afford protection at least comparable
to that afforded by the Fund Law.
APPENDIX
NEW JERSEY ENDORSEMENT PROVIDING INSURANCE AGAINST
UNINSURED

MOTORISTS

This endorsement replaces any other provisions of the policy, including any
endorsement forming a part thereof, affording similar insurance with respect to any
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured vehicle
or a hit-and-run vehicle.
In consideration of the payment of premium and subject to all of the provisions of
this endorsement and to the applicable provisions of the policy, the Company agrees
with the Named Insured as follows:
SCHEDULE
Designated Insured: ............................

Limits of Liability:

Advanced Premium 0- $ ......

Bodily Injury $10,000 each person
$20,000 each accident
Property Damage $5,000 each accident
Description of Insured Vehicles: Any highway vehicle registered or principally
garaged in New Jersey which is an owned automobile under Section A of the policy.
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1. UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
(Damages for Bodily Injury and Property Damage Caused by Uninsured Highway
Vehicles)
The Company will pay all sums which the Insured or his legal representative shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
highway vehicle because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway
vehicle; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether the
Insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, and if
so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the Insured or such
representative and the Company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible
for the bodily injury or property damage shall be conclusive, as between the
Insured and the Company, of the issues of liability of such person or organization or
of the amount of damages to which the Insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pursuant to an action prosecuted by the Insured with the written
consent of the Company.
Exclusions
This insurance does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury or property damage with respect to which the Insured, his
legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this insurance
shall, without written consent of the Company, make any settlement with any
person or organization who may be legally liable therefor;
(b) to bodily injury to an Insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other than
an insured highway vehicle) owned by the Named Insured, any Designated
Insured or any relative resident in the same household as the Named or
Designated Insured, or through being struck by such a vehicle, but this
exclusion does not apply to the Named Insured or his relatives while occupying
or if struck by a highway vehicle owned by a Designated Insured or his
relatives;
(c) to property contained in or struck by a highway vehicle (other than an insured
highway vehicle) owned by the Named Insured, any Designated Insured or
any relative resident in the same household as the Named or Designated
Insured, but this exclusion does not apply to property of the Named Insured
or his relatives while contained in or struck by a highway vehicle owned by a
Designated Insured or his relatives;
(d) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a
self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any
similar law;
(e) to the first $100 of the amount of property damage to the property of each
Insured as the result of any one accident;
(f) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any insurer of property;
(g) to property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
hit-and-run vehicle.
II. PERSONS INSURED
Each of the following is an Insured under this insurance to the extent set forth
below:
(a) the Named Insured and any Designated Insured and, while residents of the
same household, the spouse and relatives of either;
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(b) any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle; and
(c) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily
injury to which this insurance applies sustained by an Insured under (a) or (b)
above.
The insurance applies separately with respect to each Insured, except with respect
to the limits of the Company's liability.
III. LIMITS OF LIABILITY
Regardless of the number of Insureds under this insurance, the Company's liability
is limited as follows:
(a) The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the schedule as applicable to
"each person" is the limit of the Company's liability for all damages because
of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and,
subject to the above provision respecting "each person" the limit of liability
stated in the schedule as applicable to "each accident" is the total limit of the
Company's liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by two
or more persons as the result of any one accident.
(b) The limit of property damage liability stated in the schedule is the total limit
of the Company's liability for all damages because of property damage to all
property of one or more Insureds as the result of any one accident.
(c) Any amount payable under the terms of this insurance because of bodily injury
or property damage sustained in an accident by a person who is an Insured
shall be reduced by
(I) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury or property damage by or
on behalf of
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured highway vehicle and
(ii) any other person or organization jointly or severally liable together
with such owner or operator for such bodily injury or property damage,
including all sums paid under the bodily injury or property damage liability
coverage of the policy, and
(2) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account
of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability
benefits law or any similar law.
(d) Any payment made under this insurance to or for any Insured shall be applied
in reduction of the amount of damages which he may be entitled to recover
from any person insured under the bodily injury or property damage liability
coverage of the policy.
(e) The Company shall not be obligated to pay under this insurance that part of
the damages which the Insured may be entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle which represents expenses for
medical services paid or payable under the medical payments or medical
expense coverage of the policy or which represents loss paid or payable to the
Insured under any automobile physical damage insurance of the policy.
IV. POLICY PERIOD; TERRITORY
This insurance applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period and
within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada.
V. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
When used in reference to this insurance (including endorsements forming a part
of the policy):
"bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, sustained
by an Insured under (a) or (b) of the Persons Insured provision; "Designated
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Insured" means an individual named in the schedule under Designated Insured
and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household;
"highway vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer other than
(a) a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally off public
roads, while not upon public roads,
(b) a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads, or
(c) a vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
"hit-and-run vehicle" means (i) a highway vehicle which causes an accident resulting
in bodily injury to an Insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with
the Insured or with a vehicle which the Insured is occupying at the time of the
accident, or (ii) a highway vehicle which without physical contact with the Insured
or with a vehicle which the Insured is occupying at the time of the accident causes
bodily injury to an Insured arising out of an accident in New Jersey, provided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or owner of
such highway vehicle; and
(b) the Insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within
48 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, and shall have filed with the Company within 30 days thereafter a
statement under oath that the Insured or his legal representative has a cause
or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against a person
or persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in
support thereof; and
(c) at the Company's request, the Insured or his legal representative makes available for inspection the vehicle which the Insured was occupying at the time of
the accident; and
(d) with respect to subdivision (ii) the facts of such accident can be corroborated
by competent evidence other than the testimony of any person having a claim
under this or any other similar insurance as the result of such accident;
"insured highway vehicle" means a highway vehicle:
(a) described in the schedule as an insured highway vehicle to which the bodily
injury and property damage liability coverage of the policy applies;
(b) while temporarily used as a substitute for an insured highway vehicle as
described in subparagraph (a) above, when withdrawn from normal use because
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction;
(c) while being operated by the Named or Designated Insured or by the spouse of
either if a resident of the same household;
but the term "insured highway vehicle" shall not include:
(i) a vehicle while used as a public or livery conveyance, unless such use is
specifically declared and described in the policy;
(ii) a vehicle while being used without the permission of the owner;
(iii) under subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, a vehicle owned by the Named Insured,
any Designated Insured or any resident of the same household as the Named
or Designated Insured; or
(iv) under subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, a vehicle furnished for the regular
use of the Named Insured or any resident of the same household;
"Named Insured" means the individual named in the Declarations and also
includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household;
"occupying" means in or upon or entering into or alighting from;
"property damage" means injury to or destruction of (i) an insured highway
vehicle owned by the Named Insured or his spouse, if a resident of the same

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:19

household, (ii) any property owned by an Insured under (a) or (b) of the Persons
Insured provision while contained in such insured highway vehicle and (iii) any
property owned by an Insured under (a) of the Persons Insured provision while
contained in any insured highway vehicle;
"state" includes the District of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United
States, and a province of Canada;
"uninsured highway vehicle" means:
(a) a highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which
there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of
the state in which the Insured highway vehicle is principally garaged, no bodily
injury and property damage liability bond or insurance policy applicable at
the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of such vehicle, or with respect to which there is a
bodily injury and property damage liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident but the Company writing the same denies coverage
thereunder or is or becomes insolvent; or
(b) a hit-and-run vehicle, but only with respect to bodily injury caused thereby;
but the term "uninsured highway vehicle" shall not include:
(i) an insured highway vehicle,
(ii) a highway vehicle which is owned or operated by a self-insurer within the
meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrier law
or any similar law,
(iii) a highway vehicle which is owned by the United States of America, Canada, a
state, political subdivison of any such government or an agency of any of the
foregoing.
VI. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
A. Policy Provisions.
None of the Insuring Agreements, Exclusions, Conditions or other provisions
of the policy shall apply to the insurance afforded by this endorsement except
the Conditions "Notice" (or "Notice of Accident" or "Insured's Duties in
Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit"), "Changes," "Assignment," "Cancellation"
and "Declarations."
B. Proof of Claim
As soon as practicable, the Insured or other person making claim shall give to
the Company written proof of claim, under oath if required, including full
particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries, treatment, and other details
entering into the determination of the amount payable hereunder. The Insured
and every other person making claim hereunder shall submit to examinations
under oath by any person named by the Company and subscribe the same, as
often as may reasonably be required. Proof of claim shall be made upon forms
furnished by the Company unless the Company shall have failed to furnish
such forms within 15 days after receiving notice of claim.
The injured person shall submit to physical examinations by physicians selected
by the Company when and as often as the Company may reasonably require
and he, or in the event of his incapacity his legal representative, or in the
event of his death his legal representative or the person or persons entitled to
sue therefor, shall upon each request from the Company execute authorization
to enable the Company to obtain medical reports and copies of records. The
Insured or other person making claim for damage to property shall file proof of
loss with the Company within sixty days after the occurrence of loss, unless
such time is extended in writing by the Company, in the form of a sworn
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statement setting forth the interest of the Insured and of all others in the
property affected, any encumbrances thereon, the actual cash value thereof at
time of loss, the amount, place, time and cause of such loss, and the description
and amounts of all other insurance covering such property. Upon the Company's request, the Insured shall exhibit the damaged property to the Company.
C. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured.
After notice of claim under this insurance, the Company may require the
Insured to take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to preserve his
right to recover damages from any person or organization alleged to be legally
responsible for the bodily injury or property damage; and in any action against
the Company, the Company may require the Insured to join such person or
organization as a party defendant.
D. Notice of Legal Action
If, before the Company makes payment of loss hereunder, the Insured or his
legal representative shall institute any legal action for bodily injury or property
damage against any person or organization legally responsible for the use of
a highway vehicle involved in the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint or other process served in connection with such legal action shall be
forwarded immediately to the Company by the Insured or his legal representative.
E. Other Insurance.
With respect to bodily injury to an Insured while occupying a highway vehicle
not owned by the Named Insured, this insurance shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to such Insured and
applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the Insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall
be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance, and the Company shall not be liable for
greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit
of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of
this insurance and such other insurance.
With respect to property damage, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as
excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance of any kind
applicable to such property damage, and this insurance shall apply only in the
amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the amount
recoverable under such other insurance.
F. Arbitration.
If any person making claim hereunder and the Company do no not agree that
such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury or property damage
to the Insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be
owing under this insurance, then, upon written demand of either, the matter
or matters upon which such person and the Company do not agree shall
be settled by arbitration, which shall be conducted in accordance with the
rules of the American Arbitration Association unless other means of conducting
the arbitration are agreed to between the Insured and the Company, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the Company each agree to
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consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitrators
pursuant to this insurance.
G. Trust Agreement.
In the event of payment to any person under this insurance:
(a) the Company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise
of any rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization
legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage because of
which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all rights
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or organization
because of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this
insurance;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing
after loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the Company, such person shall take, through
any representative designated by the Company, such action as may be
necessary or appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such
other person or organization, such action to be taken in the name of such
person; in the event of a recovery, the Company shall be reimbursed out of
such recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in
connection therewith;
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the Company such instruments
and papers as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of
such person and the Company established by this provision.
H. Payment of Loss by the Company.
Any amount due hereunder is payable
(a) to the Insured, or
(b) if the Insured be a minor to his parent or guardian, or
(c) if the Insured be deceased to his surviving spouse, otherwise
(d) to a person authorized by law to receive such payment or to a person
legally entitled to recover the damages which the payment represents;
provided, the Company may at its option pay any amount due hereunder in
accordance with division (d) hereof.
I. Action Against Company.
No action shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the Insured or his legal representative has fully complied with all the
terms of the policy applicable to this coverage.

